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LABOR POLICY AND THE AIRLINES' MUTUAL AID PACT
Air Line Pilots Association v. CAB, 502 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
In 1958, six airline carriers' formed a Mutual Aid Pact' that compen-
sated members for operating losses incurred during strikes.3 Petition-
1. American Airlines, Inc.; Capital Airlines, Inc.; Eastern Airlines, Inc.; Pan
American World Airways, Inc.; Trans World Airlines, Inc.; and United Air Lines, Inc.
2. Six Carrier Mutual Aid Pact, 29 C.A.B. 168 (1959). See generally Kahn, Mu-
tual Strike Aid in the Airlines, 11 LAB. L.J. 595 (1960); Note, Strike Insurance: An
Analysis of the Legality of Interemployer Economic Aid Under Present Federal Regula-
tion, 38 N.Y.U.L. REV. 126 (1963); 60 COLuM. L. Rv. 205 (1960); 35 IND. Li. 491
(1960).
3. The original Pact provided financial assistance to members affected by strikes
that were called prior to the exhaustion of Railway Labor Act (RLA) procedures, that
sought settlement on terms contrary to or in excess of presidential Emergency Board rec-
ommendations, or that were otherwise unlawful. The RLA establishes procedures that
route minor disputes to the National Air Transport Adjustment Board and major disputes
to the National Mediation Board. See Railway Labor Act §§ 4, 5, 205, 45 U.S.C. §§
154, 155, 185 (1970). If the National Mediation Board believes that an unsettled dis-
pute threatens to interrupt interstate commerce so that transportation service will be de-
nied to any part of the country, it may so notify the President, who in turn may appoint
a board to investigate the dispute and issue a report. See Railway Labor Act § 10, 45
U.S.C. § 160 (1970).
Further, under the original Pact, only windfall payments representing the net profits
realized by operating Pact members from strike-diverted traffic were within the scope
of the agreement. Through a series of amendments, the carriers broadened the Pact to
include all strikes except those in which Pact members acted illegally or refused to settle
on terms equal to or less than Emergency Board recommendations. Supplemental pay-
ments of twenty-five percent of a struck carrier's normal operating expenses for strike-
closed operations were added to the Pact's benefits. Under the evolving agreement, the
liability of a member for supplemental payments was limited to one-half of one percent
of that member's previous year's income. In 1969 the Pact was amended again; supple-
mental payments were increased to fifty percent for the initial stages of a strike, and
the limit on individual carrier liability for these payments was raised to one percent.
The administrative law judge disapproved the 1969 amendments, but was subsequently
overruled by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) in its 1973 order. Airlines Mutual
Aid Agreement, - C.A.B. -, Order 73-2-110 (1973). For a history of the Pact, see
Airlines Mutual Aid Pact, - C.A.B. -, Order 70-11-110 (1970) (order granting recon-
sideration in part and remanding for further hearing); Airlines Mutual Aid Agreement,
- C.A.B. -, Order 70-7-114 (1970) (renewal); Mutual Aid Pact, - C.A.B. -, Order
E-26000 (1967) (order directing hearing); Mutual Aid Agreement, 45 C.A.B. 209
(1966) (agreement between American Airlines, Inc., and Mohawk Airlines, Inc.); Mu-
tual Aid Pact Investigation, 40 C.A.B. 559 (1964); Mutual Aid Pact, 31 C.A.B. 977
(1960) (order instituting investigation); Six Carrier Mutual Aid Pact, 29 C.A.B. 168,
reconsideration denied, 30 C.A.B. 90 (1959).
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ers4 filed suit to review an order of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)
approving increased Pact benefits and nonstruck-carrier liability for
payments. The unions alleged0 that the amended Pact7 violated the na-
tional labor policy 8 and the Railway Labor Act? (RLA), and that there
was no substantial evidence to support the CAB finding that the amend-
ed Pact was not adverse to the public interest. 10 The United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the order and
held: The Airlines' Mutual Aid Pact does not violate the national labor
policy or the Railway Labor Act and the CAB finding about the public
interest is not without substantial support."
The goal of American labor legislation 12 is the maintenance of indus-
trial peace.' 3 The RLA, like other labor laws, seeks to achieve this goal
4. The Air Line Pilots Association International; the Air Line Dispatchers' Associ-
ation; the Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Ex-
press and Station Employees; the Communication Workers of America; the Flight Engi-
neers' International Association; the International Association of Machinists and Aero-
space Workers; and the Transport Workers Union of America. The Allied Pilots As-
sociation and the Aircraft Mechanics Fraternal Association intervened.
5. Airlines Mutual Aid Agreement, - C.A.B. -, Order 73-2-110 (1973).
6. Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. CAB, 502 F.2d 453, 455 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The peti-
tioners also contested a 1971 Pact amendment allowing participation by local service car-
riers in the Pact. The court refused to consider alleged antitrust violations because the
unions had not previously raised them before the CAB, id. at 457, and certain rate-mak-
ing objections that were in the wrong procedural context, id. at 460.
7. Airlines Mutual Aid Agreement, - C.A.B. -, Order 73-2-110 (1973).
8. The national labor policy is found in the history of the administration of the
National Labor Relations Act §§ 1-18, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970).
9. Railway Labor Act §§ 1-14, 201-08, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1970).
10. Federal Aviation Act of 1958 §§ 102, 412, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1302, 1382 (1970),
requires and defines the public interest analysis to be made by the CAB when it consid-
ers agreements between carriers. Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 401(k) (4), 49 U.S.C.
§ 1371(k)(4) (1970), makes the Railway Labor Act §§ 201-08, 45 U.S.C. §§ 181-88
(1970), applicable to air carriers, and those sections of the RLA in turn make the Rail-
way Labor Act §§ 1-2, 4-14, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-52, 154-63 (1970), applicable to air car-
riers.
11. Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. CAB, 502 F.2d 453, 457, 460 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
12. For statement of the goals of the applicable labor statutes, see Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act of 1947 § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1970); Railway Labor Act § 2, 45
U.S.C. § 151a (1970); Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 102, 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970).
Though not directly applicable to RLA industries, the Labor Management Relations Act
(LMRA) and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) may be used to draw guide-
lines by analogy where the RLA is silent. See, e.g., Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 383-84 (1969); International Ass'n of Machin-
ists v. National Ry. Labor Conference, 310 F. Supp. 905, 913 (D.D.C. 1970); Pan Am.
World Airways, Inc. v. Teamsters Union, 275 F. Supp. 986, 997-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1967),
affd per curiam, 404 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1969).
13. See, e.g., Allied Chem. Workers, Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss1/14
Vol. 1975:191] MUTUAL AM PACT 193
through voluntary conciliation of major disputes, 14 good faith bargain-
ing, 15 and postponement of economic self-help until collective bargain-
ing has failed.' 6 In addition, the RLA seeks to avoid any interruption of
157 (1971) (LMRA); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & I.R.R., 353
U.S. 30, 40 (1957) (RLA); NLRB v. American Natl Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 409
(1952) (LMRA); F.W. Means & Co. v. NLRB, 377 F.2d 683, 686 (7th Cir. 1967)
(NLRA); Armco Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 344 F.2d 621, 624 (6th Cir. 1965) (NLRA);
NLRB v. R.C. Can Co., 328 F.2d 974, 978 (5th Cir. 1964) (NLRA); Roberts v. Le-
high & N.E. Ry., 323 F.2d 219 (3d Cir. 1963) (RLA); Servette, Inc. v. NLRB, 310
F.2d 659, 666 (9th Cir. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 377 U.S. 46 (1964) (LMRA);
NLRB v. Holly-General Co., 305 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1962) (LMRA); Brotherhood of
R.R. Trainmen v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 290 F.2d 266, 268 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
366 U.S. 966 (1961) (RLA); Plasti-Line v. NLRB, 278 F.2d 482, 486 (6th Cir. 1960)
(LMRA); NLRB v. Deutsch Co., 265 F.2d 473, 478 (9th Cir. 1959) (LMRA), quoting
Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 103 (1954); Oliphant v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Fire-
men, 262 F.2d 359, 361 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 935 (1959) (RLA).
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 401(k)(4), 49 U.S.C. § 1371(k)(4) (1970),
makes compliance with the RLA, including the Act's purpose section, a condition
for holding a certificate. See International Ass'n of Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc.,
372 U.S. 682, 685 (1963); Air Line Stewards Ass'n v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 267 F.2d
170, 173 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 901 (1959).
14. See Detroit & T.S.L.R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142, 148-49
(1969); Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Southern Pac. Co., 447 F.2d 1127, 1131-
32 (5th Cir. 1971); Itasca Lodge 2029, Ry. Clerks v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,
391 F.2d 657, 662 (8th Cir. 1968); Railroad Carmen, Local 429 v. Chicago & N.W.
Ry., 354 F.2d 786, 791-92 (8th Cir. 1965), quoting International Ass'n of Machinists
v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 304 F.2d 206, 209-10 (8th Cir. 1962); Florida B.C. Ry. v.
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 336 F.2d 172, 180-81 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 990 (1965); Rutland Ry. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 307 F.2d 21, 31-
32 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 954 (1963); Norfolk & P.B.L.R.R. v. Railroad
Trainmen, Lodge 514, 248 F.2d 34, 39-40 (4th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 914
(1958); Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Teamsters Union, 275 F. Supp. 986, 999-1000
(S.D.N.Y. 1967), affd per curiam, 404 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1969); Northwest Airlines,
Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 185 F. Supp. 77, 79 (D. Minn. 1960), quoting American
Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 169 F. Supp. 777, 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
15. See Detroit & T.S.L.R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142, 149 (1969);
Atlanta & W.P.R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 439 F.2d 73, 77-78 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 404 U.S. 825 (1971); Pyzynski v. New York Cent. R.R., 421 F.2d 854, 858-59
(2d Cir. 1970), citing Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 548 (1937);
Long Island R.R. v. System Fed'n No. 156, 289 F. Supp. 119, 125 (E.D.N.Y. 1968);
Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R. v. Switchmen's Union, 187 F. Supp. 581, 584 (W.D.N.Y.
1960), rev'd on other grounds, 292 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 936
(1962).
16. See Detroit & T.S.L.R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142 (1969); Dela-
ware & H. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 450 F.2d 603, 608-10 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
403 U.S. 911 (1971); Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Southern Pac. Co., 447
F.2d 1127 (5th Cir. 1971); National Airlines, Inc. v. International Ass'n of Machinists,
416 F.2d 998, 1001-02 (5th Cir. 1969); Piedmont Aviation, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots
Ass'n, 416 F.2d 633 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 926 (1970); Florida B.C.
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commerce by establishing elaborate bargaining procedures for railroads
and airlines.17 In recognition of the potentially devastating effect of
transportation strikes, these procedures more zealously protect the bar-
gaining equilibrium than do the procedures established by labor statutes
applicable to other industries.18 For example, the RLA acknowledges
Ry. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 336 F.2d 172, 180-81 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. de-
nied, 379 U.S. 990 (1965); Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Flight Eng'rs Int'l Ass'n,
306 F.2d 840, 846 (2d Cir. 1962); Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Railway Employes' Dep't,
301 F. Supp. 603, 608 (D.D.C. 1969); Railway Carmen, Lodge 886 v. Long Island R.R.,
267 F. Supp. 320, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Spokane, P. & S. Ry. v. Order of Ry. Conduc-
tors, 265 F. Supp. 892, 894 (D.D.C. 1967).
17. See, e.g., Railway Labor Act §§ 2-10, 202-05, 45 U.S.C. §§ l5la-60, 182-85
(1970). See also California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553, 558 (1957); Williams v. Jackson-
ville Terminal Co., 315 U.S. 386, 399 (1942); Virginia Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40,
300 U.S. 515, 553 (1937); Baker v. United Transp. Union, 455 F.2d 149, 153-54 (3d
Cir. 1971); Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 324 F.2d 217,
220 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 964 (1964); National Airlines, Inc. v. Inter-
national Ass'n of Machinists, 308 F. Supp. 179, 180 (S.D. Fla.), rev'd on other grounds,
430 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1971).
18. For the procedures and restrictions of the RLA see statute cited note 17 supra.
See also Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 402 U.S. 570, 571 (1971) (rc-
quirement to make every reasonable effort to reach agreement is legal obligation);
Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Association for Benefit of Non-Contract Employees, 380
U.S. 650, 658 (1965) (RLA requires preliminary steps without which agreement cannot
be reached); International Ass'n of Machinists v. National Mediation Bd., 425 F.2d 527,
536 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (right of self-help preserved until RLA procedures exhausted);
National Airlines, Inc. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 416 F.2d 998, 1001-02 (5th
Cir. 1969) (proscription on self-help while major dispute is running); Illinois Cent. R.R.
v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 398 F.2d 973, 976 (7th Cir. 1968) (minor disputes
are subject to negotiation and binding arbitration); Itasca Lodge 2029, Ry. Clerks v.
Railway Express Agency, Inc., 391 F.2d 657, 662 (8th Cir. 1968) (strike action must
be delayed until statutory procedures exhausted); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. At-
lantic Coast Line R.R., 383 F.2d 225, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (procedures are lengthy
to afford maximum inducement to make peaceful settlement); Switchmen's Union v.
Central of Ga. Ry., 341 F.2d 213, 217 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 841 (1965)
(union cannot file suit for damages or injunction until in compliance with RLA pro.
cedures); Rutland Ry. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 307 F.2d 21, 37 (2d Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 954 (1963) (railroad seeking injunction must comply with
all legal obligations); Prettner v. Aston, 339 F. Supp. 273, 285 (D. Del. 1972) (require-
ment to make every reasonable effort to reach and maintain agreement is legal obliga-
tion); Atlanta & W.P.R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 307 F. Supp. 1205, 1210 (N.D.
Ga. 1970), afj'd, 439 F.2d 73 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 825 (1971) (good faith
negotiations are required prior to self-help; refusal to negotiate will not suffice); Chi-
cago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Railway Employes' Dep't, 301 F. Supp. 603, 608 (D.D.C. 1969)
(procedures of RLA must be exhausted before resorting to self-help); Southern Pac. Co.
v. Leidenheimer, 296 F. Supp. 1377, 1379 (E.D. La. 1969) (RLA procedures are manda-
tory, exclusive, and comprehensive for grievance procedures); Pan Am. World Airways,
Inc. v. Teamsters Union, 275 F. Supp. 986, 1000 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), a! 'd per curiam,
404 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1969) (steps required by RLA are compulsory, though agreement
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss1/14
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the right of employers and employees to use economic weapons to obtain
favorable settlements, 9 but seeks to stall unilateral self-help until a
is not); Railway Carmen, Lodge 886 v. Long Island R.R., 267 F. Supp. 320, 326 (S.D.
N.Y. 1967) (initial conference provision must be met before resort to National Media-
tion Board); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 262 F. Supp.
177, 183 (D.D.C. 1967) (parties are to negotiate with aim of reaching agreement); Hu-
die v. Aliquippa & S.R.R., 249 F. Supp. 210, 212 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd per curiam, 360 F.2d
213 (3d Cir. 1966) (RLA requires compulsory arbitration of minor disputes); North-
west Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 190 F. Supp. 495, 497 (W.D. Wash.
1961) (orderly arbitration procedures must precede economic coercion); Long Island
R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 185 F. Supp. 356, 358 (E.D.N.Y. 1960) re-
quirement to make reasonable effort to reach and maintain agreement is legal obliga-
tion); Switchmen's Union v. Louisville & N.R.R., 130 F. Supp. 220, 225 (W.D. Ky.
1955) (provisions of LMRA and RLA differ in respect of method of hearing individual
grievances).
For the purposes and procedures of the LMRA and the NLRA, see NLRB v. Burns
Int'l Security Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 288 (1972) (congressional policy is to allow
negotiation for any protection parties deem appropriate); NLRB v. Wooster Div. of
Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1958) (parties are under no compulsion to
reach agreement); NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 402 (1952) (same);
May Dep't Stores Co. v. NLRB, 326 U.S. 376, 390-92 (1945) (Board has authority to
prevent unfair labor practices); Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 10-11, 13
(1940) (subchapter does not carry a penal program of fines and penalties); National
Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 361 (1940) (Board has authority to prevent unfair
labor practices); NLRB v. Newport News Shipbldg. & Dry Dock Co., 308 U.S. 241, 250
(1939) (Board is not allowed to take punitive action);. Consolidated Edison Co. v.
NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 236 (1938) (same); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1, 45 (1937) (Board is without power to compel agreement); Sign & Pictorial Local
1175 v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 726, 731 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (parties are under no compulsion
to reach agreement); NLRB v. Texas Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 365 F.2d 321, 322 (5th
Cir. 1966) (same); NLRB v. Wonder State Mfg. Co., 344 F.2d 210, 215 (8th Cir.
1965) (same); Parks v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 314 F.2d 886, 910 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 976 (1963) (it is not purpose of NLRB to constrict format
of collective bargaining); NLRB v. Clegg, 304 F.2d 168, 176 (8th Cir. 1962) (parties
are under no compulsion to reach agreement); NLRB v. Herman Sausage Co., 275 F.2d
229, 231-32 (5th Cir. 1960) (same); Textile Workers Union v. NLRB, 227 F.2d 409,
410-11 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 864 (1956) (NLRB does not forbid
strikes or limit use of economic pressure in support of lawful demands); NLRB v.
Thompson Prods., Inc., 162 F.2d 287, 293 (6th Cir. 1947) (purpose of NLRA is to leave
employees with free choice as to their best interests); NLRB v. Montgomery Ward &
Co., 133 F.2d 676, 683-84 (9th Cir. 1943) (NLRA does not compel agreement); NLRB
v. Thompson Prods., Inc., 130 F.2d 363, 368 (6th Cir. 1942) (NLRB does not have
power to punish or exact retribution for past wrongs); Globe Cotton Mills v. NLRB,
103 F.2d 91, 94 (5th Cir. 1939) (NLRA does not compel agreement); NLRB v. Bell
Oil & Gas Co., 91 F.2d 509, 513 (5th Cir. 1937) (same); Foster Bros. Mfg. Co. v.
NLRB, 85 F.2d 984, 986 (4th Cir. 1936) (purpose of NLRA is to prevent unfair labor
practices).
19. See, e.g., Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S.
369 (1969); Delaware & H. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 450 F.2d 603 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 911 (1971); Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Southern Pac.Washingto  University Open Scholarship
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strike is inevitable.2 °
In Air Line Pilots Association v. CAB,21 the court rested its labor
policy holdings on the right of economic self-help. At the outset, the
court recognized that the CAB is bound by the congressional mandate to
make decisions consistent with national labor policy.2" The court rea-
soned that since it is largely within the discretion of the bargaining par-
ties to decide upon their economic weapons after the exhaustion of RLA
procedures, the Pact was within the limits of appropriate employer self-
help.23 The opinion also relied extensively upon Kennedy v. Long Island
Railroad,2 4 a case approving a strike insurance plan for another industry
subject to the RLA. Having implicitly accepted the Board's jurisdiction,
the court affirmed three findings central to the public interest analysis
required of the CAB: 25 the airlines are particularly vulnerable to strikes;
the Pact, in all likelihood, will have no serious effect on carrier ability or
Co., 447 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir. 1971); Piedmont Aviation, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n,
416 F.2d 633 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 926 (1970); Detroit & T.S.L.R.R.
v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 267 F. Supp. 572 (N.D. Ohio 1967), aff'd, 401
F.2d 368 (6th Cir. 1968), affd sub nom. Detroit & T.S.L.R.R. v. United Transp. Union,
396 U.S. 142 (1969).
20. See Railway Labor Act § 2, 45 U.S.C. H9 151a, 152 First (1970). See also
Baker v. United Transp. Union, 455 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1971); Delaware & H. Ry. v.
United Transp. Union, 450 F.2d 603 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 911 (1971);
International Ass'n of Machinists v. National Mediation Bd., 425 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir.
1970); Piedmont Aviation, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 416 F.2d 633 (4th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 926 (1970); National Airlines, Inc. v. International Ass'n of Ma-
chinists, 416 F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1969); Itasca Lodge 2029, Ry. Clerks v. Railway Ex-
press Agency, Inc., 391 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1968); Hilpert v. Pennsylvania R.R., 290
F.2d 881 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 900 (1961); Washington Terminal Co. v.
Boswell, 124 F.2d 235 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Northern Pac. Ry. v. Brotherhood of Locomo-
tive Eng'rs, 308 F. Supp. 995 (D. Minn. 1970); Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Railway Em-
ployes' Dep't, 301 F. Supp. 603 (D.D.C. 1969); Detroit & T.S.L.R.R. v. Brotherhood
of Locomotive Firemen, 267 F. Supp. 572 (N.D. Ohio 1967), ajf'd, 401 F.2d 368 (6th
Cir. 1968), affd sub nom. Detroit & T.S.L.R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142
(1969); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 190 F. Supp. 495 (W.D.
Wash. 1961).
21. 502 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
22. Id. at 456, citing Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156,
173 (1962). The court, however, did not take into account that the CAB's labor juris-
diction extends to matters generally ancillary to the promotion of a safe, efficient, and
economically sound air transportation industry. See Federal Aviation Act of 1958 §
401, 49 U.S.C. § 1371 (1970).
23. 502 F.2d at 456.
24. 319 F.2d 366 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 830 (1963), affg 211 F. Supp.
478 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
25. See Federal Aviation Act of 1958 H§ 102, 412, 49 U.SC, §§ 1302, 1382 (1970);
noto 10 supra,https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss1/14
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willingness to promote or prolong strikes; and the burden of Pact pay-
ments does not presently, and is not likely to, affect the viability of eco-
nomically marginal airlines.2 8
The finding that the Pact is within the scope of permissible employer
self-help 27 does not comport with the dominant labor policy: the promo-
tion of industrial peace.2" The Pact threatens the underpinnings of that
policy 29 by mitigating the losses of struck carriers, thereby encouraging
them to resist early strike settlements. Narrowing the scope of the labor
policy inquiry to the right of economic self-help enabled the court to
reach an easy conclusion, but only at the expense of the goals of national
labor policy and of the RLA.
Moreover, Kennedy does not justify the heavy reliance placed on it
by the court to establish the legality of an RLA employer strike fund,
because the facts that supported the rail industry's strike insurance plan
do not exist in the airline industry. First, the railroad plan was in re-
sponse to a labor-management power imbalance peculiar to that indus-
try. 0 Secondly, the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act' required
railroads to contribute to a fund that provided benefits to striking em-
ployees. Thirdly, benefits accruing to the struck carrier in Kennedy were
more limited than those given by the Pact. The Kennedy benefits were
available only for strikes violating the RLA or attempts at enforcing
demands contrary to presidential Emergency Board recommenda-
tionss2 and even then the benefits covered only fixed costs. 3
26. Airlines Mutual Aid Agreement, - C.A.B. -, Order 73-2-110 (1973). The
CAB finding that Pact payments do not and will not affect the viability of economically
marginal airlines does not present any consideration relevant to the labor policy discus-
sion of the Pact.
27. 502 F.2d at 456-57.
28. See cases cited note 13 supra.
29. See cases and statutes cited notes 13-17 supra; text accompanying notes 13-17
supra.
30. Indicative of that imbalance was the unions' use of the "whipsaw" strike, a tech-
nique by which a union can concentrate its strength by striking one member of a multi-
employer association. See Kennedy v. Long Island R.RL, 211 F. Supp. 478, 482 n.5,
488 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), affd, 319 F.2d 366 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 830 (1963).
Whipsaw strikes and multi-employer bargaining had been customary tactics in the rail
industry for at least thirteen years before Kennedy. Id. at 482.
31. 45 U.S.C. § 351-67 (1970).
32. 211 F. Supp. at 487.
33. Id. at 484. Furthermore, all benefits were to cease if fifty percent of the mem-
ber railroads experienced strikes at the same time. See Note, Strike Insurance: An
Analysis of the Legality of Interemployer Economic Aid Under Present Federal Legisla-
tion, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 126, 131 (1963), citing, Service Interruption Policy art. VI(a),
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Part of the problem with the court's labor analysis is caused by its
ready acceptance of the CAB's findings. There may be substantial fac-
tual support for these findings, but their relevance to labor policy is as-
sailable. Although the Board has had much experience in dealing with
the economic structure of the airline industry and has dealt with the
Pact for over a decade, 84 it has no special labor-management relations
skills. For example, the CAB found that the airlines' inability to stock-
pile cargo makes them more vulnerable to strikes than nonservice in-
dustries and other transportation industries carrying a higher percentage
of freight. 5 It is difficult to see how the ability to store cargo would
protect a carrier from the effects of a strike, since it is reasonable to as-
sume that a shipper would be reluctant to send his cargo to a struck
carrier regardless of the carrier's ability to store cargo. Further, al-
though air carriers may be particularly vulnerable to strikes, Congress
has chosen to regulate the area through the bargaining scheme of the
RLA,36 not through extrastatutory employer measures.
The court's affirmance of the CAB's finding that the Pact would have
no serious effect on carrier willingness to prolong strikes ignored the
practical effect of paying profits to Pact members. The unions' ability to
use the strike as an effective and protected self-help technique" is
obviously hampered by such payments. The court attempted to mini-
mize this factor by pointing out that the Pact payments were lower than
normal operating profits.88 Profits, however, were still being made. 0
Joint Record vol. I, at 282, Kennedy v. Long Island R.R, 211 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y.
1962). The Kennedy plan was supported by 189 railroads, whereas the airlines' fund
was started by six carriers. See Note, supra, at 129 n.13.
34. See note 3 supra.
35. 502 F.2d at 458.
36. See cases and statutes cited notes 17 & 20 supra. See also Detroit & T.S.L.R.R.
v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142, 148 (1969); Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R.,
339 U.S. 239, 24243 (1950); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R.,
290 F.2d 266, 268 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 966 (1961); Estes v. Union Termi-
nal Co., 89 F.2d 768, 770 (5th Cir. 1937); Railroad Shop Crafts, Lodge 3 v. Lowden,
86 F.2d 458, 460 (10th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 659 (1937).
37. See, e.g., Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S.
369, 377-80 (1969); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S.
682, 685 (1963); Piedmont Aviation, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 416 F.2d 633, 637
(4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 926 (1970).
38. 502 F.2d at 459. The figures for normal operating profits and poststrike losses
were submitted by the airlines as interested parties and accepted by the CAB without
any investigation into the reliability of the figures. Since they are peculiarly within the
knowledge of the airlines and therefore less likely to be subject to a successful adversary
attack, it seems inadvisable for the Board to take these figures at face value.
39. Since the 1969 amendments, National experienced a four-month strike, during
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Although the Pact by its terms does not interfere with the right to call a
strike, its provisions for profits during a strike remove the impetus to call
one.
Traditionally, great weight is given to administrative board find-
ings.40 This deference, however, should be limited to those findings with-
in the administrative board's expertise. The legality of the Pact is ques-
tionable in view of the dominant goals of the RLA and national labor
policy. Moreover, its legality should not be decided by an administrative
agency whose expertise is in economic affairs, whose public interest
analysis centers on economic matters, not labor policy, whose jurisdic-
tion over labor-management matters is open to challenge, and whose
findings are based upon economic grounds that undercut the operation
which it conducted no operations but had a net income of $810,000 after deducting $8.4
million for depreciation and amortization. Northwest, while operating twenty-nine per-
cent of its activities during a five-month strike, had a profit of $17.9 million before taxes
after deducting $32.8 million for depreciation and amortization. TWA, operating
twenty-five percent of its activities, had a net loss of $879,000 during a two-day strike
after deducting $621,000 for depreciation and amortization. TWA estimated that, had
it not suffered a strike, its losses would have been $1,687,000. Mohawk, experiencing
a three-month strike that closed all of its operations, realized a $29,000 profit after de-
ducting $1.8 million for depreciation and amortization and $1.4 million for nonoperating
expenses. See Brief for Petitioner Air Line Pilots Ass'n at 31-32, quoting Initial Deci-
sion of Examiner Arthur S. Present, at 17-18 (1972).
There is also the remaining question of the Pact's effect on economically marginal
airlines. As of December 31, 1968, United, the Pact's highest contributor, had a work-
ing capital of $45,994,000. United's working capital as of December 31, 1970, was $17,-
520,000. By United's own estimate, had there been no Pact its working capital as of
December 31, 1970, would have been $47,225,000. See Brief for Petitioner Air Line
Pilot Ass'n at 41, quoting Initial Decision of Examiner Arthur S. Present, at 29-30
(1972).
40. See, e.g., NLRB v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 350 U.S. 264 (1956); O'Leary v.
Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504 (1951); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194
(1947); NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944); Gray v. Powell, 314
U.S. 402 (1941); Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125 (1939); Shields
v. Utah Idaho Cent. R.R., 305 U.S. 177 (1938); Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co. v.
United States, 292 U.S. 282 (1934); ICC v. Union Pac. R.R., 222 U.S. 541 (1912);
Federal Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 239 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Brotherhood of Ry.
Clerks v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 239 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Ferenz v. Folsom,
237 F.2d 46 (3d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1006 (1957); American Airlines,
Inc. v. CAB, 231 F.2d 483 (D.C. Cir. 1956); United Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 228 F.2d
13 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Director, United States Bureau of Mines v. Princess Elkhorn Coal
Co., 226 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1955); Namekagon Hydro Co. v. FPC, 216 F.2d 509 (7th
Cir. 1954); NLRB v. Pinkerton's NaVl Detective Agency, 202 F.2d 230 (9th Cir. 1953);
American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 178 F.2d 903 (7th Cir. 1949); Apgar Travel Agency,
Inc. v. International Air Transp. Ass'n, 107 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); 4 K. DAvis,
ADMINisTRATIE LAW TREATISE §§ 30.05, 30.06 (1958).
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of national labor policy and deny the labor issue the primacy it deserves.
Alternatives to this situation might be to enlarge the CAB's mandate to
include an affirmative investigation into the labor ramifications of issues
presented to it, to restrict the CAB's mandate and present such issues
initially to the district courts, or to empower an existing board to adjudi-
cate such controversies. The present state of affairs is not helpful in ob-
taining a full and fair resolution of the issues.
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